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on the guest structure.
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1 Introduction
Mega sport events receive a lot of attention not only by politicians but also by the general
public. The desire for hosting such events is very high. The high investment costs required
are usually justified by the gains in terms of reputation and positive short-run as well as
long-run effects on the economy.
Although the common sense agrees with the presumed positive impact of major sport
events, the academic literature investigating and quantifying the effects of hosting interna-
tional sports tournaments or similar mega-events reports mixed evidence at best. For instance,
Baade and Matheson (2004) argue that hosting World Cups does not always induce econom-
ically beneficial effects. In an ex-post analysis of the 1994 Word Cup held in the US the
host cities experienced cumulative losses of 5.5-9.3 billion US-$ instead of expected gains of 4
billion US-$. Szymanski (2002) focuses on the impact of mega events on economic growth and
estimates even a negative contemporary impact of a soccer World Cup. Similarly, Matheson
(2006) and Matheson (2009) show that the economic impact of mega-events is mixed and
question the magnitude of the economic multipliers researchers have calculated.
Obviously tracking the impact on economic growth does not tell you where the effect
mainly stems from or if there are substitution effects present. Therefore, there are studies
that explore effects on employment, tourism, trade and image. Studies from the German
Bundesbank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2006) as well as from the German Institute for Economic
Research (DIW) (Brenke and Wagner, 2007) reveal positive but rather negligible effects of
the soccer world championship. Concerning the quantification of the effect, theses studies
focussed on expenditures of tourists and tourism in general. Other studies like Hagn and
Maennig (2009) monitor the impact on the labor market and find no substantial reduction of
unemployment rates in venue cities compared to other cities. Further evidence highlighting
potential other effects like “feel-good” and public image is provided by Maennig and du Plessis
(2007). Rose and Spiegel (2011) find significant and large trade effects for the hosting country.
Remarkably, unsuccessful bids to host the Olympics have a similar impact on exports.
We contribute to this literature in two ways. First, we provide an empirical analysis based
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on firm-level data from a survey addressing restaurants and hotels. This is the sector which is
supposedly most affected by the championship. On the basis of the survey, we infer whether
the firms observed sales effects and whether these effects were greater or lower than expected.
Thus, we can control for the counterfactual scenario as we extract how the sales growth would
be without the EURO and can calculate the difference. The survey also investigates how the
firms responded to the event in terms of price changes and in changes of capacity. This allows
us to analyze the factors which affected changes in sales. Furthermore, we are able to track
the role of capacity constraints. Second, we expand the scope by focussing on firms’ long-term
expectations. Long-term effects are often neglected in the literature. Welcome exceptions are
works by Spilling (1996) and Jasmand and Maennig (2008). We analyze the link between
short-run experiences and long-run expectations: on the basis of the survey, we investigate
how the performance in terms of sales during the EURO 2008 affects the expectations of
long-run economic impacts.
Overall, we find that no direct aggregate short-run impact of the EURO 2008 on the
economy has been observable for Switzerland. The companies participating at the survey
even reported, on average, that their realized sales were lower than the amount they would
have expected without the Euro 2008. There is, however, a strong heterogeneity across firms.
Using econometric means we provide evidence that especially hotels in city areas where games
took place were better off. Contrary, restaurants in the same areas reported substantially
worse sales effects. Finally, we show that only a small fraction of the surveyed companies
believe in a positive long-run impact of the EURO 2008. Interestingly, that assessment does
not depend on whether firms benefitted during the EURO 2008, but on wether they were
visited by different or new customers.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present aggregate data for Switzerland
and test whether an EURO 2008 effect becomes apparent. Next, we introduce the survey and
discuss the main results in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
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Figure 1: Retail sales in Switzerland: food, beverages and tobacco; at constant prices, ad-
justed for sales days. Index, 2005=100 (Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office)
2 Was there an Aggregate Effect of the EURO 2008?
In the following we discuss the aggregate effects during the EURO 2008 (EURO hereafter) in
Switzerland by analyzing retail sales and overnight stays. The EURO took place from June
7 to June 29, possible effects should thus be visible in the June readings. We start with the
monthly retail sales figures. As the total retail sales contain many categories of goods which
cannot be expected to be sold additionally because of the EURO (e.g., fuel or toilet articles),
we examine the category “Food, Beverages and Tobacco”. Although the latter is certainly
not the only category to potentially benefit from the EURO, it is a category which can be
expected to show a concentrated peak in June in the presence of EURO-related benefits.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the Swiss retail sales since 2004, at constant prices and
adjusted for sales days (June values are marked by vertical lines). Apart from the strong
seasonal pattern, the figure shows that June 2008 was not an exceptionally strong month.
The reading is better than the June 2007 reading, but this holds for the year 2008 in general.
Furthermore, the values of the year 2009 are in the same range as the values of the year 2008.
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Figure 2: Overnight stays in Swiss hotels and health resorts, year-to-year growth rates (Source:
Swiss Federal Statistical Office)
In the presence of strong EURO-induced benefits, we would expect the June 2009 reading to
lie below the June 2008 reading. We thus conclude that there is no clear EURO effect visible
in the retail sales of food, beverages and tobacco.
We now turn to overnight stays in hotels and health resorts in order to assess the effect
of the EURO on the Swiss hotel sector. Figure 2 shows the year-on-year growth rates of
the number of overnight stays in hotels and health resorts in Switzerland. Interestingly,
the growth rate was negative in June 2008, i.e. less overnight stays were registered than in
June 2007. The EURO thus seems to have brought rather disappointing effects for the hotel
sector. The Swiss Hotel Association explains this result by the fact that many congresses and
seminars that would usually have been held in June were rescheduled or canceled because of
the EURO1. The EURO thus caused a crowding out effect in the hotel sector which was not
entirely compensated by the presence of football fans.
1Cp. press release of the Swiss Hotel Association from 2008/08/08
5
3 Evidence from Microdata
As the aggregate data may wash out the effects of the EURO we rest our main analysis on
a firm level analysis. In the first part we will introduce the data and discuss the descriptive
evidence which highlights remarkable differences in the experience regarding the EURO. In
the second part we will test the possible determinants of a potential positive or negative effect
using econometric means.
3.1 The Survey
In order to assess the effects of the EURO more in detail, a questionnaire was sent out to
1285 hotels and restaurants, of which 707 answered. The response rate thus amounted to
55%. Table 8 shows the questions asked together with the variable names and encodings used
in the analysis. The core of the questionnaire were the estimated immediate effects and the
expected long run effects of the EURO. The participants were asked twice about the effect
they estimated the EURO to have on their sales. The first question was categorical and asked
whether the expected sales effect was positive, zero or negative. Additionally, the firms were
interrogated if this effect had turned out as expected or worse/better than expected. In order
to estimate the immediate effects quantitatively, the firms were furthermore asked for the
evolution of their sales in June 2008 as compared to June 2007, as well as for the respective
evolution they would have expected without the EURO taking place. We define the short
run EURO premium as the difference between the effective sales growth and the hypothetical
growth expected without the EURO. This sales premium variable therefore already controls
for a counterfactual scenario of sales in the absence of the soccer tournament. Thus, we do
not need a difference-in-difference methodology to identify the EURO 2008 effects. With
regard to the long-run effects, the firms were directly asked if they expect any such effects for
themselves. Further questions about the business development in June 2008 concerned the
amount of food and drinks sold for restaurants, respectively the amount of overnight stays
for hotels, the type of guests received and for hotels additionally the average length of stay of
the guests. Finally, the questionnaire inquired whether the firms increased their capacities or
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charged different prices during the EURO. As additional explanatory variables, we include the
number of employees and dummies for the tourism zones and the hotel sector in our analysis.
With respect to the categorical question, only 25% of the corresponding answers indicated
positive sales effects during the EURO. On the other hand, 28% indicated negative sales
effects. With regard to the element of surprise, 11% of the answers indicated that the effect
had turned out better than they had expected. The corresponding share of negative surprises
amounted to 29%. Additional details are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Contingency Table for categorical question on sales effects and realization of expec-
tations (absolute numbers in parantheses)
Sales effect No effect Sales effect Total
negative on sales positive
Worse than expected 16% (111) 6% (44) 7% (45) 29% (200)
As expected 10% (69) 36% (248) 13% (85) 59% (402)
Better than expected 2% (12) 4% (27) 6% (39) 11% (78)
Total 28% (192) 47% (319) 25% (169) 100% (680)
The slightly negative assessment of the sales effect is also visible in the quantitative sales
differences which the participants stated. Figure 3 shows the mean values for the short run
EURO premium for all participants, as well as for the two sectors and the three firm size
categories. Figure 4 shows the corresponding box plots. The mean EURO premium over
the whole sample lies at -2.8 percentage points, i.e. the participants estimated on average
that their sales growth was diminished by 2.8 percentage points by the EURO. However, the
figures reveal considerable differences between the sectors, regions and firm size categories.
With regard to the sector, we note that restaurants rated the EURO effect on average clearly
negative (-4.8 percentage points), while hotels estimated it on average only slightly negative
(-0.2 percentage points). All four tourism zones (“Mountains”, “Lakes”, “Big Cities”, “Other
areas”) report clearly negative effects on average. The Boxplots reveal that the zone ”Big
Cities” has the largest share of positive reported premiums, but also the largest dispersion.
The division into firm size categories2 shows clearly negative results on average for small and
medium firms. The big firms reported less pessimistic results, but also showed the largest
2Small firms: up to 9 employees; medium firms: 10 to 49 employees; big firms: 50 employees and more
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Figure 3: Short run EURO premium, mean values for whole sample, sectors, regions and firm
size categories in percentage points
dispersion. As the dispersion is rather high in general, neither the mean over all participants
nor the mean over any of the mentioned subcategories is significantly different from zero.
Actually, the share of firms estimating a zero direct effect is not to be underestimated: the
median lies at zero for all categories, and 36% of the answers estimated the effect to be zero.
The shares of positive and negative estimated premia lie at 23% and 40%, respectively.
Prices were increased predominantly in hotels during the EURO. From those firms having
increased their prices, 55% estimated a positive premium. As this share exceeds the share of
overall positive answers (23%), raising prices seems having paid off in most cases.
An interesting question arises with respect to the expectations regarding a long-run effect
of the EURO 2008. Although only those participants which had estimated a positive sales
premium were invited to answer this question, table 2 shows that it was answered actively by
participants having estimated negative, zero and positive premia. The question concerning
the expected long run effects was answered by 53% of all participants. Out of these answers, a
vast majority of 77% (41% of the total number of participants) stated that they did not expect
to profit from the EURO in the long run. Out of those firms expecting long run benefits, 84%
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Figure 4: Short run EURO premium, box plots for whole sample, sectors, regions and firm
size categories in percentage points
indicated the they anticipated gaining additional customers, while 32% counted on image
gains for Switzerland (multiple entries were possible). The share of participants expecting
no long run effects exceeds the one of participants expecting long effects for all categories
of estimated sales premia (in total 41% vs. 12%). Furthermore, this table allows us to test
whether these expectations regarding the long run effects are conditional on the short-run
experience during the EURO championship. Very interestingly, our results show that the
answers seem to be idiosyncratic and that we do not see a systematic connection between the
estimated sales premium and the corresponding expected long run effect. From those firms
that expect a positive long-run effect, 5% estimated positive sales premia, but there were also
4% which had suffered a negative premium and despite that expected positive effects in the
future. A similar picture emerges for the group of companies that expected no long-run effect:
while 10% experienced a negative sales premium, 8% had a positive sales premium.
9
Table 2: Contingency Table for short run / long run effects (absolute numbers in parentheses)
No long run effect Long run effect No answer
expected expected long run effect Total
Sales premium < 0 10% (70) 4% (25) 17% (119) 31% (214)
Sales premium = 0 13% (93) 2% (14) 12% (85) 27% (192)
Sales premium > 0 8% (59) 5% (36) 4% (29) 18% (124)
No answer concerning
Sales premium 9% (64) 2% (11) 14% (96) 24% (171)
Total 41% (286) 12% (86) 47% (329) 100% (701)
3.2 Econometric Analysis
Our descriptive analysis has shown that the impact of the EURO championship was on average
negative but also revealed substantial variation across the individual companies surveyed. In
the following section, we try to identify the variables driving EURO premium empirically.
We would like to highlight to which extent the outcome is driven by strategic changes in
prices, quantities and capacities. Furthermore, we will also concentrate on the determinants
of the long-term assessment and test whether current experiences are linked to the long-run
assessment. For instance, one could easily conjecture that individual restaurants or hotels
that reported positive premia at the soccer tournament are also more likely to expect long-run
gains.
3.2.1 Immediate Sales Premium impact
To analyze the short-run impact on the sales premium as defined in Table 8 we estimate the
following equation:
si = α+ β1pi + β2qi + Γ
′Xi + εi, (1)
where s is the return premium, p denotes the price component, q the quantity component,
X is a vector containing further control variables (company characteristics), βi’s and Γ are
coefficient estimates and εi is an i.i.d error term. We use ordinary least squares estimation
with robust standard errors. As the sales premium has a price and a quantity component,
we control for both in order to test whether different premia are driven by changes in prices
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or quantity. Furthermore, we include company specific attributes like location, type and
employees. Finally, we control for capacity expansions and changes in the guest structure.
We start with the overall sample. The results in Table 3 show that the quantity component
plays an important role as it is statistically significant at the 1%-level. On the other hand,
the price component is not significantly related to the Euro premium at this stage. Thus, the
sales premium was driven by quantity effects. Furthermore, companies which had expanded
their capacities reported higher premia. This makes sense as they could serve more customers
and thus increase their profits. Finally, hotels in big cities experienced higher premia. This
is in line with our expectations as basically all major cities in Switzerland served as a venue.
Hotels in big cities thus seem to have profited from the presence of fans. Apart from the
hotels in big cities, neither location nor firm size is relevant for reaping the benefits of the
championship.
In a next step we split our sample into restaurants and hotels and estimate columns (1)
and (2) of Table 3 separately. The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. From the results
it becomes apparent that hotels and restaurants have been affected differently. Starting from
the top, in both cases profit effects were driven by quantity effects during the EURO 2008.
With regard to the price components, we note that only hotels have a positive impact from
the price on the sales. About 30% of the participating hotels increased their prices, which
increased their sales on average. On the other hand, only very few restaurants changed their
prices. It seems plausible that hotels are more likely to adjust their prices for overnight stays.
Restaurants on the other hand faced increased competition during the soccer championship
due to the established ‘fan-zones’.
Concerning the location, the results differ in the cities: while restaurants in big cities
recorded negative sales premia, hotels in big cities increased their sales, i.e. had more guests.
Furthermore, expanded capacities influenced sales only for restaurants. In addition, the guest
structure had an impact on the sales premium for hotels: those hotels receiving other guests
than usual reported higher premia. Interestingly, the size of the restaurant or hotel did not
matter in any case.
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Table 3: Regression results for short run EURO premium, hotels and restaurants
(1) (2)
VARIABLES sales diff sales diff
quantity 6.57*** 6.54***
(0.69) (0.66)
prices 1.99
(1.34)
hotel -0.49
(1.15)
log empl -0.04
(0.60)
mountain -1.41
(1.36)
lake 0.27
(1.49)
city -3.05
(1.93)
guest struc 3.40** 3.65***
(1.38) (1.31)
capacity temp 3.87* 3.63*
(2.11) (2.16)
hot city 6.37** 4.85***
(2.64) (1.85)
Constant -3.09** -4.14***
(1.43) (0.54)
Observations 464 465
R2 0.298 0.285
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 4: Regression results for short run EURO premium, restaurants only
(1) (2)
VARIABLES sales diff sales diff
quantity 7.89*** 8.02***
(1.05) (0.91)
prices -2.15
(2.46)
log empl -0.44
(0.98)
mountain -1.28
(1.81)
lake -0.91
(1.82)
city -3.09
(2.00)
guest struc 2.18
(2.24)
capacity temp 5.91** 5.55**
(2.54) (2.37)
Constant -1.82 -3.77***
(1.86) (0.62)
Observations 262 263
R2 0.303 0.285
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 5: Regression results for short run EURO premium, hotels only
(1) (2)
VARIABLES sales diff sales diff
quantity 5.19*** 5.13***
(0.87) (0.84)
prices 2.84* 3.75***
(1.63) (1.39)
log empl 0.16
(0.69)
mountain -0.22
(2.76)
lake 2.53
(2.92)
city 3.88
(3.56)
guest struc 4.70*** 5.11***
(1.72) (1.44)
capacity temp -2.52
(3.68)
guest length 2.89
(1.87)
Constant -5.61 -3.97***
(3.59) (0.81)
Observations 187 209
R2 0.328 0.279
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.2.2 Long-run impact
Most studies on the economic impact of sports events focus on short-run effect only. In our
survey, we also asked firms whether they expected any long-run impact of the EURO. In
this section, we investigate the determinants of the probability to believe in a positive long-
run impact of the EURO. The obvious main candidate is the short-run experience from the
championship. This experience can be driven by monetary issues like the sales premium.
But also surprises may be important, like unexpected additional guests or an unexpectedly
high sales premium. We thus control for the surprise component in the EURO premium and
conjecture an unexpected sales premium to affect the long-run assessment.
We employ a probit model of the standard form:
P (Y = 1 | x) = Φ(x′β) (2)
where P is the probability, Φ is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the standard
normal distribution. The parameters β are estimated by maximum likelihood.
We control for the sales premium of the firms and therefore for the pecuniary effect, for the
social effect as represented by changes in the guest structure and for the surprise component.
Our results are as follows. Table 6 column (1) shows the basic estimation using an ordered
variable (values -1, 0, 1) for the EURO sales premium and controlling for firm size, tourism
zone, type (hotel or restaurant), the guest structure and expanded capacities. Surprisingly
but not fully unexpectedly given Table 2, we find no relationship between sales premium
and the expectations regarding the long-run impact. This implies that companies answered
independently of having benefitted or suffered from the EURO in terms of sales. Furthermore,
while we find no impact of size or location of the company on the response pattern, the guest
structure, expanded capacities and a hotel dummy are of great importance. Accordingly,
hotels on the one hand and firms having expanded their capacities temporarily and/or having
received other guests than usual during the EURO on the other hand expect positive long-
run effects with a higher probability. In column (2) we include only the variables that were
statistically significant in column (1). Going from a general to a more specific setup does
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not alter the results. Thus, we can conclude that the assessment of future prospects is
more influenced by social interaction than by monetary benefits. Those firms which received
other guests than usual during the EURO are more optimistic. The same holds for firms
having expanded their capacities temporarily. The final column (3) shows that the surprise
component is of great importance. Both positive and negative surprise exert a meaningful
impact on the probability of responding positively to this question. Furthermore, it seems
that positive surprises outperform negative surprises. We can deduct from this result that
unexpected occurrences matter for the long-run assessment. While in most studies, especially
in finance, negative surprise dominate, like for instance in stock market, in this case positive
surprise tend to dominate negative surprises in terms of the size of the coefficient.
3.2.3 Robustness
In order to check the robustness of our results, we estimate the same model as in section 3.2.1
using categorical variables. While including a continuous figure for the sales premium allowed
us to quantify the effects, the numbers indicated by the firms might be subject to random
individual errors. The resulting estimator would then still be consistent and unbiased, but
the confidence bands would widen. To account for that, we transform the sales premia into
a new categorical variable capturing the sign of the sales premia (thus the categories are:
-1,0,1). This setup requires us to switch to a different estimation technique, namely ordered
probit estimation. Probit estimations are a special case of ordered probit. Instead of two
outcomes, we are now dealing with three outcomes. Thus, the equation amends to:
P (Y = 1 | X) = 1− Φ(x′β) (3)
P (Y = 0 | X) = Φ(µ− x′β)− Φ(x′β) (4)
P (Y = −1 | X) = 1− Φ(µ− x′β), (5)
where in addition to the previous estimation procedure µ is the cutoff point. Above from
these adjustments we employ the same set of explanatory variables.
The results are presented in Table 7. The first two columns show the same regressions as
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Table 6: Regression results for long run effects
(1) (2) (3)
long run eff long run eff long run eff
sales diff ordered -0.03
(0.11)
size 0.07
(0.13)
mountain 0.15
(0.29)
lake 0.10
(0.28)
city -0.15
(0.32)
hotel 0.37 0.53***
(0.24) (0.17)
guest struc 1.02*** 0.99***
(0.22) (0.18)
capacity temp 0.68*** 0.62***
(0.24) (0.22)
hot city 0.29
(0.39)
surprise positive 0.85***
(0.24)
surprise negative -0.57**
(0.28)
Constant -1.61*** -1.53*** -0.76***
(0.31) (0.14) (0.08)
Observations 282 346 370
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.20 0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Robustness Check for short run EURO premium, hotels and restaurants
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES sales diff ordered sales diff ordered sales diff ordered
quantity 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.75***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
prices 0.28* 0.36**
(0.16) (0.15)
hotel 0.1
(0.14)
size -0.14
(0.09)
mountain -0.01
(0.16)
lake 0.19
(0.16)
city 0
(0.18)
guest struc 0.36** 0.40*** 0.31**
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
capacity temp -0.1 -0.15
(0.18) (0.17)
hot city 0.47* 0.55*** 0.41*
(0.28) (0.2) (0.22)
Observations 464 465 485
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.17 0.18
cut1 -0.34* -0.22*** -0.19***
(0.18) (0.07) (0.07)
cut2 0.90*** 1.01*** 1.05***
(0.18) (0.08) (0.08)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
Encoding of variable size: 1: 1 to 9 employees; 2: 10 to 49 employees; 3: more than 49 employees.
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Table 3, column (3) shows the results obtained by using significant variables only. Overall
- now judging only on the direction of the link and its significance - we can confirm the
result retrieved from the estimations in Section 3.2.1 for the gross of our variables. That
said, there are some differences. First, the variable capturing price changes is now significant.
Thus the price adjustment stemming from hotels seems to materialize more strongly in the full
sample regression. Furthermore, the variable capturing capacity expansions loses its statistical
significance. Thus, we must differentiate our results to the degree that in a qualitative analysis,
there is also a price effect in addition to the already known quantity effect. On the other
hand, we can reinforce the result that hotels in cities were better off in terms of the sales
premium.
Finally, we check whether there may be any kind of selection bias present in our study. As
we have received surveys where the critical sales question has not been answered we need to
control whether leaving out theses firms affects our estimation. For this purpose we conduct
a Heckman selection estimation. Results are presented in Table 9. As can be seen from the
table, the selection issue seems to be of minor importance as the explanatory power of the
first stage regression is very low. The partial pseudo R-Squared of the significant explanatory
variables at this stage is roughly 0.02%. Furthermore, the second stage results are therefore
very similar to the results obtained without this correction for a potential selection bias.
4 Conclusions
It is commonly believed that major sport event have a huge and positive economic impact.
Several recent studies already investigated a possible economic effect of such major sport
events and find rather disappointing results regarding the potential benefits. The empirical
evidence reveals either rather small positive effects or very mixed results. In this study, we add
to the existing literature by providing evidence on the impact of the EURO 08 championship
based on firm-level survey data. While the overall effect may vanish rapidly or be averaged
out, micro-level evidence allows us to track the effects more directly. In addition, we can
control for a counterfactual and we are able to search the determinants of a positive or
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negative effect of the soccer tournament. Furthermore, most studies concentrate only on the
direct effect of the championship. We also ask and investigate whether hotels and restaurants
believe in a positive long-run impact of such events and explore the determinants of these
beliefs.
Looking at economic figures during the EURO 2008 soccer championship for Switzerland,
we find no effect in the aggregate series. However, consulting a survey of companies conducted
during the soccer championship, we can offer a more qualified insight into the economic effects
of the event. Surveying hotels and restaurants, we find that firms estimate the EURO to have
diminished the year-on-year sales growth by roughly 2.5% on average. However, the impact is
very heterogeneous across companies and sectors. First, hotels in cities report more beneficial
sales effects while restaurants in general tend to have experienced worse sales effects. The
latter might be partly explained by the additional possibilities to buy drinks outside and the
public-viewing spots. Furthermore, the composition of the sales effect is different. While for
both restaurants and hotels, the sales effects had a quantity component, there was additionally
a price effect for hotels. Apart from the analysis of these short-term effects, we are also able
to present information on expected long-run gains. Out of those firms having answered to
corresponding question, only 23% believe in a positive effect. Notably, this response does not
depend on the sales impact of the event but on the guest structure.
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Table 8: Variable Names and Definitions
Variable Question/Definition Encoding
sales impact What impact did the EURO 2008 have on your sales? -1: negative impact
0: no impact
1: positive impact
impact surprise Was the impact (if there was any) as expected? -1: worse / less good
0: no impact / as expected
1: better / less bad
sales What was the percentage change in your sales change in %
in June 2008, as compared to June 2007?
sales no euro What percentage change in sales would you have change in %
expected without the EURO 2008 in June 2008,
as compared to June 2007?
sales diff = sales - sales no euro (”EURO premium”) percentage points
long run eff If you experienced positive effects on your sales: 0: no
do you expect any positive effects of the 1: yes
EURO 2008 on your firm in the long run?
quantity How did the amount of overnight stays / of -1: amount decreased
food and drinks sold in June 2008 compare 0: same amount
to June 2007? 1: amount increased
guest struct Did you receive other guests than 0: no
usually in June 2008? 1: yes
guest length Did the average length of stay of guests during -1: guests stayed shorter
the EURO 2008 differ from the usual length 0: guests stayed as long as usual
of stay? (hotels only) 1: guests stayed longer
prices Did you charge other prices than -1: lower prices
usually in June 2008? 0: same prices
1: higher prices
capacity temp Did you increase your capacities temporarily 0: no
for the EURO 2008? 1: yes
log empl Logarithm of number of employees
mountain Dummy for tourism zone ”Mountains” 0; 1
lake Dummy for tourism zone ”Lakes” 0; 1
city Dummy for tourism zone ”Big Cities” 0; 1
hotel Dummy for hotel sector 0; 1
hotel mountain Dummy for ”Hotel in tourism zone mountains” 0; 1
hotel lake Dummy for ”Hotel in tourism zone Lakes” 0; 1
hotel city Dummy for ”Hotel in tourism zone Big Cities” 0; 1
hotel other Dummy for ”Hotel in tourism zone Other Regions” 0; 1
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Table 9: Heckman regression
VARIABLES sales diff selection equation
log empl 0.17***
(0.06)
quantity 6.49*** 0.06
(0.66) (0.07)
prices -0.02
(0.2)
guest struc 3.71*** 0.08
(1.34) (0.17)
capacity temp 3.57* 0.07
(2.17) (0.2)
hotel 0.43**
(0.17)
city 0.1
(0.2)
mountain 0.26
(0.19)
lake 0.13
(0.18)
hot city 5.10*** 0.43
(1.89) (0.39)
Constant -4.13*** 0.19
(1.05) (0.18)
athrho -0.01
(0.25)
lnsigma 2.37***
(0.09)
Observations 573 573
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
23
